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ABSTRACT
This article deals with the communicational aspects of Aristotle’s theory of significa-
tion as laid out in the initial chapters of the De Interpretatione (Int.).1 We begin 
by outlining the reception and main interpretations of the chapters under discussion, 
rather siding with the linguistic strand. We then argue that the first four chap-
ters present an account of verbal communication, in which words signify things via 
thoughts. We show how Aristotle determines voice as a conventional and hence acci-
dental medium of signification: words as ‘spoken sounds’ are tokens of thoughts, 
which in turn are signs or natural likenesses of things. We argue that, in this way, 
linguistic expressions may both signify thoughts and refer to things. This double 
account of signification also explains the variety of ontological, logical and psycho-
logical interpretations of the initial chapters of Int.
	 1.	 We	follow	the	standard	
edition	of	the	Greek	
text	of	Int.	by	Minio-
Paluello	(1949:	47–72),	
unless	otherwise	
stated.	All	references	
to	Aristotle’s	works	
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follow	the	citation	
style	based	on	the	
authoritative	Bekker	
edition:	work	title	or	
abbreviation;	book	
and	chapter	reference;	
Bekker	numbering	
(page	number,	column	
letter,	and	line	number);	
translator’s	name	
(where	appropriate).
	 2.	 Ammonius,	
Commentary on 
Aristotle’s	De 
Interpretatione	(4.17–24	
Busse);	cf.	Diogenes	
Laertius,	Lives of the 
Philosophers	(V.28–29).	
On	the	history	of	
Aristotle’s	Organon	and	
the	alleged	position	of	
the	De Interpretatione 
in	it,	see	Frede	(1987:	
18–21);	Sorabji	(1990:	
1–2,	64–66);	Barnes	
(2005:	51–57);	Aubenque	
(2009:	37–38);	Husson	
(2009:	20–21).	
1. RECEPTION AND INTERPRETATIONS OF THE INITIAL CHAPTERS 
OF INT.
Aristotle’s short treatise named Perì herme¯néias, better known by its Latin 
name De Interpretatione, was included in the Organon, so-called by Aristotelian 
commentators who compiled Aristotle’s works on logic and placed the short 
text between the Categories and the Prior Analytics.2 As a result, a traditional 
doctrine was formed, according to which the De Interpretatione (hereafter Int.) 
is a study of propositions, and this tradition has detached the first four chap-
ters, reducing them to a preparatory role for Aristotle’s discussion on contra-
dictory pairs of propositions. 
This tradition was implemented by two authoritative translators whose 
annotated works have since become standard for English and French readers 
of Aristotle. Disregarding the first four chapters of Int., J. Ackrill (1963: 113) 
holds that they should be considered as separate from the rest of the treatise: 
‘Fortunately, the notion that utterances are symbols of affections in the soul 
and that these are likenesses of things does not have a decisive influence on the 
rest of the De Interpretatione’. On his view, the treatise truly begins at Chapter 5 
and deals with statements (Ackrill 1963: 125). Likewise, C. Dalimier (2007: 
252–53), in the preface to her French translation of Int., considers the treatise 
to be traditionally about statements (propositions déclaratives) rather than about 
linguistic expressions and the role of language in communication. Although she 
introduces terms of linguistics and grammar in her translation (parole, rhème, 
noms fléchis), she undermines the importance of the first chapters: ‘La première 
partie du traîté qu’on pourrait dire propédeutique (les cinq premiers chapitres) 
se dirige donc vers la définition du «couple de contradictoires» ou contradiction 
[…] donnée au chapitre 6’ (Dalimier 2007: 255, original emphasis).
Hence the issues of language and communication outlined in the first 
chapters of Int. have been dismissed in recent scholarship, with few nota-
ble exceptions. There is a line of interpretation from Waitz (1844) to Walz 
(2006), emphasizing the linguistic and semantic agenda of these first chapters. 
In the critical edition of Aristotle’s Organon, Waitz (1844: 324) renders the title 
as De communicatione sermonis, suggesting that this text is a first attempt at 
sketching a grammar of natural language. For Aristotle begins by saying what 
a name is and how it is distinct from a verb. Linguist E. Coseriu (1967: 87, 
112) even claims that Aristotle proposes a manual of general linguistics long 
before F. de Saussure. In his programmatic article, N. Kretzmann places the 
first chapters in the field of semantics: 
[a] few sentences near the beginning of the De Interpretatione (16a3–8) 
constitute the most influential text in the history of semantics. […] In 
this paper I develop an interpretation that depends on taking seriously 
some details that have been neglected in the countless discussions of 
this text. 
(1974: 3)
Kretzmann’s reconstruction focuses on Aristotle’s explanation of pho¯nê 
se¯mantikê, ‘spoken sound significant by convention’ (1974: 3), and relocates 
these chapters from logic to ‘semantic theory’, specifying that ‘[t]he point of 
16a3–8 is the presentation not of a general theory of meaning but of grounds 
for the claim that linguistic signification is conventional […]’ (Kretzmann 
1974: 10). This line of interpretation has recently lead M. Walz (2006: 230) to 
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	 3.	 That	does	not	mean	
Aristotle	has	no	
coherent	theory	of	
language;	similarly,	in	
the	Poetics	(1447a28–
b24)	he	complains	that	
there	is	no	name	to	
designate	what	we	
call	‘literature’,	and	
yet	comes	up	with	a	
classical	theory	of	its	
main	genres.	Closest	
to	our	notion	of	
‘language’	is	Aristotle’s	
use	of	lógos,	a	word	
which	appears	in	too	
many	senses	to	be	
definitely	taken	as	a	
technical	term	(see	
Bonitz	1870:	433–37;	the	
adjective	logikós,	which	
gives	the	name	‘logic’,	
derives	from	it,	as	well).	
Aristotle’s	views	on	
language	stricto sensu	
are	mostly	part	of	his	
physiological	research	
and	deal	with	how	
animals	make	‘noises’,	
have	‘voice’	and	
‘communicate’	through	
vocal	articulation;	for	
a	detailed	analysis	
of	Aristotle’s	‘biology	
of	language’,	see	Ax	
(1978)	and	Zirin	(1980).	
All	this	reinforces	
the	claim	that	in	
the	beginning	of	Int.	
Aristotle	discusses	the	
main	‘communicative’	
aspects	of	human	
language.
	 4.	 See	Int.	1	(16a1−4).	
	 5.	 Pace	Noriega-Olmos	
(2013:	118),	Ogden	and	
Richards’s	([1923]	1966:	
9–11)	triangle	shows	
the	‘essential	elements	
in	the	language	
situation’,	namely	‘the	
relations	of	thoughts,	
words	and	things	
as	they	are	found	in	
cases	of	reflective	
speech’.	The	language	
situation	involves	a	
speaker,	a	hearer	and	
how	they	use	signs	to	
communicate	with	one	
another.	However,	this	
approach	is	the	reverse	
of	Aristotle’s,	for	it	
purports	to	explain	a	
linguistic	situation	in	
psychological	terms,	
whereas	Aristotle,	as	
we	understand	him,	
analyses	the	above-
named	essential	
offer ‘a more literal reading’ of the initial passages of Int., focusing on ‘linguis-
tic entities’: ‘The opening lines of On Interpretation should be taken as a meta-
linguistic reflection on human language’s mode of being […]. [T]he focus is 
on how a human linguistic entity actually exists, as both a physical and mean-
ingful reality […]’ (2006: 231).
This focus on language is also acknowledged by some commentators of 
Aristotle’s logic. Thus C. W. A. Whitaker (1996: 8–73) makes a detailed analy-
sis of Aristotle’s conception of ‘significant utterances’. We follow Whitaker’s 
view that Int. is closer to the Topics and the Sophistici Elenchi than the Categories 
and the Analytics, in that it explores the problem of contradiction crucial to 
dialectic practice. However, we do not argue, as he does (Whitaker 1996: 6–7), 
that the work is misplaced among the other works of the Organon, but that its 
initial chapters were mistakenly incorporated in Aristotle’s ‘logic’. Contrary to 
Whitaker, we hold that the ‘supposedly linguistic chapters’ could be read as 
a dense and sketchy, yet independent examination of how language commu-
nicates, especially when it comes to the oral discussions philosophers held 
in Aristotle’s day. Thus we disagree with his claim that they ‘do not form an 
independent investigation into language’ (Whitaker 1996: 7). 
2. ARISTOTLE’S ‘DE COMMUNICATIONE’?
In our view, these chapters do not concern formal logic, or even informal 
logic, because there Aristotle discusses the basic elements of verbal and non-
verbal communication: namely, ‘parts of speech’ (names and verbs) and their 
relation to things, on one hand, and to thoughts, on the other. This concern 
is as much part of logic as of disciplines such as grammar and linguistics. In 
addition, we avoid terms such as ‘linguistics’, ‘logic’, ‘logical grammar’ and 
‘conventionalism’ because these are technical terms introduced by commen-
tators in the Aristotelian tradition but not proper to Aristotle himself. We 
should note that Aristotle does not even use a term for language3 but rather 
speaks of notions pertaining to the so-called ‘parts of speech’, such as name 
and verb, and what language users do with them in speech (pho¯nê).4 Our read-
ing of the first four chapters, then, focuses on the problem of signifying through 
language use, or of communication in and by language.
When discussing Aristotle on language and how it relates to reality, 
usually the following two passages are cited:
(1) For, since it is impossible to converse (dialégesthai) by bringing in the 
actual things under discussion (tà prágmata), but we use words (onómata) 
as tokens (sýmbola) in the place of things, we think that what happens 
with the words also happens in the case of things, just as people who 
count think that happens with the counters (psêphoi). But it is not really 
the same; for words and the number of expressions are limited, whereas 
things are infinite in number; and so the same expression (lógos) and 
each single name (ónoma) must necessarily signify (se¯máinein) a greater 
number of things (pléio¯). As, therefore, in the above illustration, those 
who are not good at managing the counters are deceived by the experts, 
in the same way in discussions (lógoi) also those who are inexperienced 
with the power of words are victims of false reasoning (paralogízontai), 
both when they themselves converse (dialegómenoi) and when they are 
listening (akoúontes) to others. 
(Sophistici Elenchi 1, 165a6–18, trans. E. S. Forster, altered)
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elements	by	means	of	
a	top-bottom	account.	
Ogden	and	Richards,	
on	the	other	hand,	
consider	linguistic	
meaning	as	a	result	of	a	
psychological	process,	
in	the	behaviourist	
vein:	‘[…]	whenever	
we	“perceive”	what	
we	name	“a	chair”	
we	are	interpreting	a	
certain	group	of	data	
(modifications	of	the	
sense-organs),	and	
treating	them	as	signs	
of	a	referent’	([1923]	
1966:	22).
	 6.	 See	Kretzmann	(1974:	
6);	Walz	(2006:	241–42).	
Aristotle	seems	to	
use	herme¯néia	as	
a	broad	term	for	
‘communication’,	both	
human	and	animal:	
see	Bonitz	(1870:	287).	
In	the	Poetics	(1450b13)	
he	defines	the	actors’	
speech	or	‘diction’	
(léxis)	as	‘expression	
through	choice	
of	words’	(dià tês 
onomasías herme¯néia;	
trans.	S.	Halliwell),	
which	communicates	
the	author’s	‘thought’	
(diánoia)	to	the	
audience.	A	similar	
model	of	linguistic	
communication	
is	developed	by	
Boethius	in	his	
Second Commentary 
on Aristotle’s De 
Interpretatione	
(23.27–24.10	Meiser;	
cf.	Ammonius,	
Commentary on 
Aristotle’s De 
Interpretatione,	18.30–
33	Busse).	On	‘encoding’	
and	‘decoding’	in	
Aristotle’s	terms	see	
Int.	(16b20–21),	where	
he	explicitly	states	that	
communication	is	a	
process	of	transmitting	
thoughts	between	a	
speaker	and	a	hearer,	
which	prefigures	the	
well-known	Bühler	
(1934)	and	Jakobson	
([1956]	1976)	model	of	
sender	and	receiver.	
(2) Incidentally (katà symbebe¯kós), it is hearing that contributes most to 
intelligence (phróne¯sis). For speech (lógos) is a cause of instruction in 
virtue of it’s being audible, not as itself (kath’ hautón), but incidentally 
(katà symbebe¯kós); since it is composed of words (onómata), and each 
word is a token (sýmbolon). Accordingly, of persons lacking either sense 
from birth, the blind are more intelligent than the deaf and dumb. 
(De Sensu 1, 437a11–18, trans. J. Beare, altered)
From the above-cited passages we infer the following two points:
1. Philosophy occurs in conversation and the communication of thought 
occurs through speech. This means that Aristotle is very close to the 
modern communication model, according to which a message is trans-
mitted between an encoding sender and a decoding receiver through the 
particular medium of voice, which serves as the matter of language (cf. GA 
V.7, 786b22).
2. Speech communicates things through words, which, as conventional 
signs, stand for things, but not in a one-to-one relation, since there is 
no natural match between words and things. In other words, language 
does not mirror reality by communicating it, but obeys systematic laws 
of its own, such as, for example, the semantic rule of one-to-many as 
mentioned at (1).
The first four chapters of Int. develop these points further. There, Aristotle 
claims that words not only refer to things but also signify thoughts. Contra 
Noriega-Olmos (2013: 173), who sustains that Aristotle only relates words to 
thoughts, we hold a ‘two-step account’ of verbal signification (Charles 2014), 
namely that Aristotelian linguistic expressions refer to things via thoughts. 
Unlike Noriega-Olmos, we do not regard two-step accounts in terms of what 
he calls ‘Ogden & Richards’ semiotic triangle’, or how words (symbols) are 
associated in our minds with ‘concrete’ objects (referents) (2013: 118–19).5 On 
our reading of Aristotle, linguistic expressions signify thoughts, which may 
or may not refer to things. In addition, things may be mental or non-mental 
entities, and the latter may be universals, or external ‘concrete objects’, to use 
Noriega-Olmos’ expression. On the latter’s account, by contrast, linguistic 
expressions neither refer to mind-independent universals such as ‘cause’, nor 
to mind-dependent objects that have no ‘concrete’ likeness (Charles 2014), 
nor to external objects. 
In addition, Noriega-Olmos (2013: 272–73) considers expressions such as 
‘goat-stag’, ‘green dragons’ or ‘counters’ as thought-contents or formal aspects 
of thought, at the risk of psychologizing not only universals, but also numbers, 
abstract concepts, such as [infinity], or the concepts of time and space, which 
Aristotle does not consider as thought-contents or formal aspects of thought. 
What, for example, would be the formal aspect of the thought [goat-stag], 
the thought [three] or the thought [we]? A two-step account, on the other 
hand, also allows for some expressions to signify thoughts without referring 
to things such as ‘green dragon’, or counters such as ‘flock of birds’ which 
stand for certain things without matching their number. Likewise, indetermi-
nate expressions such as ‘not-man’ signify some thought-content although 
they do not refer (cf. 16b11–15). It is clear then, that at the beginning of Int. 
Aristotle considers different levels of reality: linguistic, mental and external, 
but it is not always clear which one is under discussion.
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Taking our cue from the above-mentioned line of linguistic interpretation, 
we propose a close reading of the first four chapters of Int., showing that they 
deal with the basic elements of verbal communication and treat the distinc-
tion between conventional tokens and natural signs, on one hand, and the 
analogy between spoken signs and written marks, on the other. By ‘verbal 
communication’ we intend the process of encoding and decoding information 
in and by language, as attested by the title word herme¯néia and in some later 
models of language and communication influenced by Aristotle.6 We argue 
that in the initial chapters of Int. Aristotle examines what is ‘signifying’ and 
what is ‘not signifying’ in order to account for how signifying expressions are 
used to communicate our thoughts and beliefs. But he does not establish any 
systematic theory of meaning or signification, as Ackrill (1963: 113) seems 
to believe. In addition, we note some parallels between Aristotle and later 
theories of language and logic without considering him as their precursor. We 
do not examine the latter part of the treatise, which is undoubtedly a work 
pertaining to logic.
3. ARISTOTLE’S ACCOUNT OF CONVENTION IN LANGUAGE USE
Aristotle explains the communicative function of language by consider-
ing linguistic signs as arbitrary and introduces the notion of convention in 
language use.7 We follow Walz (2006: 240) on the distinction between natu-
ral and conventional entities. Physical parts of speech may not correspond 
to signifying parts of language. For, similar to later phoneticians, Aristotle 
distinguishes between inarticulate sounds (noises) and articulate sounds 
(utterances). The fact that the latter express thoughts through phonetic articu-
lation is only an accidental property of voice. As Kretzmann (1974: 6) explains, 
‘spoken sounds are symbols of mental impressions’ insofar as they are ‘rule-
governed embodiments of mental impressions in another medium’, that is, 
voice, which only accidentally becomes speech. 
Voice, therefore, has both physical and linguistic aspects, which Aristotle 
relates to different kinds of signification and communication. He uses the 
word se¯méion for designating signs and when describing the relation between 
signs and thoughts.8 A sign naturally indicates the object of which it is a sign, 
as someone’s smile may indicate her friendly attitude. By contrast, he uses the 
word sýmbolon for designating the linguistic relation between thoughts, words 
and things, which is arbitrary and conventional.9 
We follow Kretzmann (1974: 8), Whitaker (1996: 9–11) and Walz (2006: 
238–40) by applying Aristotle’s distinction between ‘symptom’ as a necessary 
relation between a sign and the object it indicates, on one hand, and ‘token’ 
as an arbitrary or conventional relation between a word and the object it 
denotes, on the other. From the arbitrary nature of tokens follows the notion 
of convention for delimiting mental and linguistic items and their relation to 
things. We claim that this is Aristotle’s main point in the first four chapters 
of Int. There, Aristotle examines what naming is, what names and verbs are, 
and how they relate to thoughts and things. According to him, words are 
not directly related to things but relate to thoughts, which in turn relate to 
things.10 Names refer to things via thoughts and they stand for things. 
He begins his treatise by defining the parts of speech and determining 
how natural language is used: ‘First we must settle what a name is and what a 
verb is, and then what a negation, an affirmation, a statement and phrase are’ 
(Int. 16a1–2). Then he distinguishes between spoken sounds (literally ‘those in 
	 7.	 Cf.	Aubenque	(2009:	
41):	‘[C]e	qui	intéresse	
ici	Aristote	est	
l’interprétation	des	
signes	linguistiques:	
dans	quelle	
mesure	les	signes	
linguistiques,	écrits	
ou	parlés,	reflètent-
ils	adéquatement	
les	représentations	
et,	à	travers	elles,	les	
choses?’
	 8.	 The	authors	of	the	Port 
Royal Grammar	([1660,	
1662]	1972:	5,	intro;	2.i,	
28)	have	taken	up	the	
Aristotelian	notion	that	
signs	signify	thoughts	
and	thoughts	are	
articulated	in	words.	
	 9.	 We	follow	Kretzmann	
(1974:	8)	and	Walz’s	
(2006:	231)	view	that	the	
first	four	chapters	of	
Int.	advance	a	crucial	
distinction	between	
sign	and	symbol,	pace	
Noriega-Olmos	(2013:	
57),	who	conflates	
them.	However,	we	
disagree	that	words	
are	both	symbols	and	
signs.	Language	is	
symbolic	as	such.	Voice,	
on	the	other	hand,	is	a	
physical	entity,	which	
may,	or	may	not,	be	
used	to	express	a	word	
(a	symbolic	entity).	
Aristotle	is	interested	
in	the	conventional	
aspect	of	vocal	sounds	
and	the	rules	for	
encoding,	decoding,	
and	communicating	
meanings.	We	also	
disagree	with	Noriega-
Olmos	(2013:	173–74)’s	
view	that	Aristotle	does	
not	develop	the	‘social’	
aspect	of	linguistic	
conventions:	‘[Aristotle]	
does	not	emphasize	
the	social	aspect	of	
the	relation	between	
linguistic	expressions	
and	their	significatum,	
but	only	the	fact	that	
the	relation	is	arbitrary	
in	the	sense	that	it	
depends	on	human	
choice’.	According	
to	Noriega-Olmos,	
linguistic	arbitrariness	
does	not	depend	on	
social	practice,	since	
‘Aristotle’s	interest	
is	simply	to	show	
that	the	phonetic	
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speech’, tà en têi pho¯nêi) and written marks (tà graphómena): ‘Spoken sounds 
are tokens of affections in the soul and written marks are tokens of spoken 
sounds. Just as written marks are not the same for all men, neither are spoken 
sounds’ (16a3–5). Since he explicitly ties sýmbolon to convention, we translate 
sýmbolon as ‘token’:11 ‘I say “by convention” (katà synthêkēn) because no utter-
ance is a word (ónoma)12 by nature, but only when it becomes a token (sýmbo-
lon) of something’ (16a26–28).13 
Tokens are conventional because they are adopted to stand for or refer to 
what they signify by agreement. Aristotle’s explanation of convention is that 
an utterance is not a word by nature but only when it becomes a sýmbolon of 
something – i.e. when it denotes an object in a medium which is not naturally 
related to that object.14 On his view, the utterance ‘stone’ denotes a solid non-
metallic mineral because of an agreement between language users. The word 
‘stone’ is a token (sýmbolon) of the non-metallic mineral by virtue of conven-
tion adhered to by language users in order to identify the latter by means of 
the former. A linguistic token (sýmbolon) can be simple or compound. Such 
a token can be a word, phrase or sentence; whereas the first two are signifi-
cant by themselves, the latter comprises, at least, one part significant by itself 
(16b33–17a1; 24b1–2).
Aristotle emphasizes the role of convention in oral and written language 
use by distinguishing between mere noises, sounds, and names and by 
adding that even animals make noises, which indicate (de¯loûsi) something, 
but none of those utterances is a name (16a28–29). Unlike utterances, names 
are linguistic expressions, which stand for something and express a sense, 
whereas ‘beasts’ inarticulate noises’ (agrámmatoi psóphoi) merely signal or 
indicate, without referring to anything. Nor do animals express noises accord-
ing to a convention (16a28). Thus a dog’s growl is a natural sign of anger with-
out linguistically expressing a sense, although that sense [anger] is inferrable 
from the growl.15 Signs show and signal, but tokens tell. 
Accordingly, Aristotle defines a sign as something from which something 
else may be inferred: ‘that which coexists with something else, or before or 
after whose happening something else happened, is a sign of that some-
thing’s having happened or being’ (APr II.27, 70a7–9, trans. Tredennick, 
1938). If there is a sign, then there is by necessity some object of which it 
is a sign. If smoke is a sign, this is because it is an indicative mark of fire. 
Likewise, a melting slab of butter in the sun is a sign of the latter’s heat. In 
this sense, signs are distinctive or infallible marks of an object, as Aristotle 
points out in the Rhetoric (I.2, 1357b14–18): fever is a sign of illness, or a 
woman giving milk is a sign that she has lately born a child; they support 
the relation of particulars to universals and constitute a complete proof. 
Sýmbola or tokens, on the other hand, are accidentally established medi-
ums of exchange, as money serves as a token for goods,16 or tickets serve 
as a token of our right to use the subway. Signs necessarily signify by indi-
cating distinctive features of an object, whereas the signification of a token 
or tally depends on an agreement between the parties concerned, i.e. on 
convention. 
3.1. Aristotle on the relation between signs, thoughts and words
Spoken sounds or utterances (pho¯nái) and written marks or letters (tà graphó-
mena) are ‘not the same for all men’, precisely because they are not ‘like-
nesses’ of things but arbitrary conventions or signs which say and tell: 
aspect	of	linguistic	
expressions	does	
not	determine	their	
signification’	(2013:	
169).	However,	Aristotle	
introduces	a	series	of	
distinctions	within	
the	classes	of	names,	
verbs	and	sentences,	
clearly	delimiting	
their	function	
and	eliminating	
indeterminates	such	
as	‘not-man’	from	their	
classification.	This	
shows	his	interest	in	
clear	rules	of	linguistic	
practice	between	
interlocutors,	which	
relate	to	pragmatics	
rather	than	to	
phonetics.
	 10.	 The	claim	is	best	
summarized	by	
the	Neoplatonist	
Ammonius	in	
his	Commentary 
on Aristotle’s De 
Interpretatione	(see,	
e.g.,	17.24–26	Busse)	
but	can	be	seen	
already	in	Porphyry	
(In Int.	78F	Smith,	
preserved	in	Boethius’	
Second Commentary 
on Aristotle’s De 
Interpretatione,	
25.15–29.29	Meiser).
	 11.	 In	support	of	our	
translation	of 
sýmbolon	as	‘token’,	
we	refer	to	LSJ (sv.:	
1676–77),	which	does	
not	mention	at	all	
the	English	word	
‘symbol’	in	its	entry	of	
sýmbolon,	but	makes	
explicit	that	it	denotes	
‘token’	or	‘mark’.	In	
English	usage,	‘symbol’	
refers	to	a	sign	used	to	
represent	something	
else	–	such	as	the	
Red	Cross	Symbol	–	
or	to	a	material	
object	representing	
something	abstract	
(Webster’s Dictionary).	
The	Greek	word,	on	the	
other	hand,	denotes	a	
tally	or	token:	
σύμβολον,	τό,	
tally,	i.e.	each of 
two halves or	
corresponding 
pieces	of	an	
ἀστράγαλος	or	
other	object,	which	
two	ξένοι,	or	any	
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And just as written marks are not the same for all men, neither are 
utterances. But the affections of the soul which these are primarily signs 
(se¯méia) of are the same for all. And what these affections are likenesses 
(homoiômata) of – actual things (prágmata) – are also the same. 
(16a6–8)
Spoken sounds and written marks are primarily signs (se¯méia) of affections in 
the soul, and these latter are ‘likenesses’ of things.17
We reconstruct Aristotle’s argument in 16a3–8 as follows: spoken marks 
are tokens of affections in the soul, and written marks are tokens of spoken 
marks. But the first things of which these tokens are signs are affections in 
the soul. Whereas tokens stand for something or refer to that thing via a sign, 
signs directly signify or show that thing. Aristotle carefully determines linguis-
tic signs (se¯méia) as tokens (sýmbola) of ‘affections in the soul’ (tà en têi psykhêi 
pathêmata) (cf. 24b1–2). The question is: what are ‘affections in the soul’? 
Aristotle tells us they are ‘likenesses of things’ and, at 16a8–9, refers to his trea-
tise On the Soul, where he discusses these issues in more detail. Commentators 
usually locate the passage in question at De An. I.1, 402a9 and 403a3–b19 
(esp. 403a7–11), where ‘affections of the soul’ (páthe¯ or pathêmata tês psykhês) 
are related to thinking (tò noéin). On this reading, affections in the soul are 
thoughts, which is confirmed at Int. 16a13–15, where Aristotle relates isolated 
names and verbs to a simple thought (nóe¯ma), as well as at 23a32–33, where he 
says that ‘things in the voice follow things in the thought (toîs en têi dianóiai)’. 
Vocal propositions are symbols of those in the soul, but pace Noriega-Olmos 
(2013: 8–9), their components do not necessarily relate to each other in exactly 
the same way. Thus the verbal expression ‘white horse’ does not have the 
formal structure of the thought [white horse]. In our view, Aristotle indicates 
two types of significations: the likeness relation between thoughts and things 
and the symbolic relation between words and things via thoughts. 
The next question is: in what sense can thoughts be likenesses of things? In 
De An. 430b5, Aristotle writes: ‘that which makes each thing one is its concept 
(noûs)’. According to Noriega-Olmos (2013: 132), ‘the term “likeness” indi-
cates that thoughts are numerically different from their objects but formally 
the same as the formal aspect of their objects’. However, this statement does 
little to explain the likeness relation between thoughts and things. Noriega-
Olmos considers likeness as non-photographic and non-pictorial, but only as 
having the same ‘formal aspects’ as the object likened. Yet Aristotle’s concept 
seems to be broader, comprising abstract entities such as magnitude, proper-
ties such as colours, and even objects of perception (aisthêmata) such as horses 
or stones. For example, the thought [redness] presents the form of a certain 
quality and [bigness] presents the form of a certain relative quantity. Aristotle 
says of the soul’s objects of knowledge: ‘[t]hese must be either the things 
themselves or their forms. Not the things themselves; for it is not the stone, 
which is in the soul, but its form. Hence […] the intellect is a form of forms 
[…]’ (De An. III.8, 431b27–432a2, trans. D. Hamlyn). 
Thoughts are thus affections in the soul, which are likenesses or presenta-
tions of things. Depending on the thing or presentation, the likeness can be 
pictorial or non-pictorial. However unclear this discussion is, what matters 
for Aristotle is that these likenesses are forms (éide¯), which are non-linguistic, 
and hence they are not conventions. The thought of an object is passively 
assimilated to its form as a natural imprint or páthema in the mind. Thoughts 
internally present éide¯, which leave an imprint on the soul and thus affect 
two contracting 
parties, broke 
between them, 
each party keeping 
one piece, in order 
to have proof of 
the identity of the 
presenter of the 
other. 
(LSJ: 1676). 
  Aristotle follows this 
traditional use of 
sýmbolon, as can be 
clearly seen from the 
Index Aristotelicus 
(Bonitz 1870: 715). 
Likewise, Whitaker 
(1996: 10–11) rejects 
the translation of 
sýmbolon as ‘symbol’, 
because ‘the English 
word has acquired 
senses which the Greek 
word lacked’ (Whitaker 
1996: 10). However, 
we do not apply the 
Peircean type/token 
distinction, which 
is irrelevant to our 
discussion of Aristotle’s 
text.
 12. We translate ónoma 
as ‘word’ or ‘name’, 
depending on context 
(cf. Int. 16b19–20). The 
Greek word ónoma 
denotes the English 
word ‘name’, which 
has a wider use than 
‘noun’. The latter is a 
grammatical term and 
derivate of nomen, the 
Latin word for ‘name’, 
and does not cover 
adjectives, as Greek 
ónoma does. 
 13. Cf. De Sensu 1 (437a12–
15). The same applies 
to any other complex 
significant unit such as 
a phrase or a sentence 
(lógos: Int. 16b33–17a1; 
24b1–2). 
 14. Cf. Kretzmann (1974: 6): 
‘Spoken sounds, those 
that constitute words, 
are rule-governed 
embodiments of 
mental impressions 
in a vocal medium 
just as written marks, 
those that constitute 
pronounceable sets, 
are rule-governed 
embodiments of 
spoken sounds in a 
visual medium’.
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	 15.	 For	more	details,	
see	Ax	(1978);	Zirin	
(1980);	Whitaker	(1996:	
45–51).	For	other	
passages	by	Aristotle,	
where	articulated	
human	‘speech’	is	
distinguished	from	
animal	‘noises’,	see	De 
An. II.8	(419b4–421a6);	
HA	I.1	(488a31–b1);	IV.9	
(535a27–536b23);	Poet.	
20	(1456b22–34);	Pol.	
I.1	(1253a9–18);	GA	V.7	
(786b20–22).
	 16.	 Cf.	Boethius,	Second 
Commentary on 
Aristotle’s De 
Interpretatione	
(32.13–33.2	Meiser).
	 17.	 In	the	Sophistici 
Elenchi (165a4–17),	
Aristotle	considers	
words	as	tokens	of	
things,	manipulated	by	
a	thinker	like	pebbles	
used	in	a	calculation,	
whereas	in	Int.	he	
regards	words	as	signs	
and	tokens	of	thoughts	
(‘affections	in	the	soul’);	
cf.	Whitaker	(1996:	
9–25).	On	the	difference	
between	spoken	
sounds	and	written	
marks	as	linguistic	
signs	see	Kretzmann	
(1974:	7).
	 18.	 Cf.	Whitaker	(1996:	
9),	who	argues	that	
thoughts	are	formal	
likenesses	of	things:	
‘thinking	of	a	dog	
means	conceiving	a	
formal	likeness	of	a	dog	
in	one’s	mind’.	On	this	
view,	éide¯	exemplify	
or	resemble	a	general	
notion	and	designate	
a	concrete	referent.	
For	further	discussion	
of	the	homoiômata	
question,	see	Polansky	
and	Kuczewski	(1990:	
53–57);	Modrak	(2001:	
219–41);	Carson	(2003:	
322–34);	Noriega-Olmos	
(2013:	107–15).
	 19.	 Clearly,	Aristotle	uses	
the	verb	se¯máinein	
to	render	‘signify’	in	a	
broad	sense,	as	he	uses	
it	to	describe	relations	
between	words	and	
thoughts	(as	here,	in	
Int.),	as	well	as	between	
words	and	things	(SE	1,	
165a13–14).	In	addition,	
thinking (De An. III.4–5).18 Thus Aristotle seems to posit an imprint-likeness 
relation between thought and reality. As Charles puts it: 
Aristotle allows for a variety of types of signification, depending on 
the types of thought-content involved. In some cases, what is signified 
will be a mind-independent object (of which thoughts are causal like-
nesses), in others – as in thoughts of goat-stags – it will not be (since 
there is no likeness relation).
(2014)
Between thoughts and words, on the other hand, there is a non-causal, 
conventional relation. Hence thoughts are not replicable in but rather 
expressible through words (linguistic conventions) and, more importantly, 
they become truth-evaluable when combined in a proposition. In isolation, 
the simple thoughts [man] and [white] are neither true nor false, ‘for both 
falsity and truth imply combination and division’ (Int. 16a10–12). The éidos of 
a man is a non-linguistic and natural thought or form, which is the same for 
all humans. It is expressible in words and refers to a thing (a man) by means 
of the name ‘man’. 
Furthermore, as Crivelli (2004: 82–88) points out, linguistic expressions 
may signify both thoughts and non-mental objects. Citing Int. (16a6–7): ‘the 
first items of which these [sc. spoken sounds] are signs are […] affections 
of the soul’, he comments: ‘In saying this Aristotle is probably implying that 
objects are the second items of which spoken sounds are signs’ (Crivelli 2004: 
88, n. 36). Crivelli’s point also supports what Charles (2014) calls a two-step 
account of signification, contra Noriega-Olmos’ one-step account: ‘The first 
step relates linguistic expressions to affections in the soul, the second thoughts 
to external objects’.19
4. ‘SIGNIFYING EXPRESSIONS’ AND THE ROLE OF ‘IS’
In this section, we provide a brief comparison between Aristotle and Frege 
and contrast their view of ‘is’ with that of some other commentators in order 
to illustrate how certain issues raised by Aristotle in the first chapters of Int. 
appear in the later historical and philosophical context. We suggest that in 
distinguishing between different kinds and uses of words, Aristotle puts 
forward a linguistic rather than onto-logical theory in regard to explaining 
what linguistic expressions are, how names and verbs are combined ‘to say 
something of something’ and when linguistic expressions are truth-evaluable. 
For Aristotle, an expression is truth-evaluable if it refers to a thought, which, 
in turn, designates a concrete referent as well as denoting a general notion.20 
In this way, he implies what Frege calls the distinction between sense (Sinn) 
and reference (Bedeutung) when examining non-referring expressions such as 
‘not-man’ or ‘goat-stag’, that have sense but lack reference.21 The first chapter 
of Int. concludes:
Just as, in the soul, a thought is sometimes neither true nor false, and 
sometimes must be either true or false, so is in speech. For both falsity 
and truth imply combination and separation. Nouns and verbs by 
themselves are like thoughts without combination or separation, such 
as ‘man’ or ‘white’ when nothing is added; so far they are neither true 
nor false, but are only signs of this or that.22 Even the word ‘goat-stag’ 
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se¯máinein	can	also	
signify	the	relation	
between	things	(APr	
II.27).	That	is	why	one	
cannot	build	a	model	of	
communication	based	
on	Aristotle’s	use	of	
the	verb	se¯máinein.	On	
Aristotle’s	vocabulary	
of	signification,	see	
Noriega-Olmos	(2013:	
42–56).
	 20.	 Our	reading	differs	
from	Whitaker’s,	who	
argues	that	words	
signify,	or	correspond	
to,	things	(1996:	25,	58).	
We	suggest	that	words	
signify	thoughts	and	
refer	to	things.
	 21.	 For	Frege	(1892:	100),	
a	sense	is	‘a	mode	
of	presentation	of	a	
Bedeutung	(referent)’.	
Unlike	Irwin	(1982:	
243	ff.),	we	do	not	
attempt	to	correlate	
signification	to	
meaning,	but	follow	
Frege’s	distinction	
between	sense	and	
reference.	
	 22.	 In	translating	line	
16a16	we	accept	
the	re-punctuation	
proposed	by	Whitaker	
(1996:	34).
	 23.	 Ademollo	advances	a	
more	nuanced	version	
of	this	view:	
The	claim	that	
the	copula	‘is	a	
component	in	the	
affirmation	as	
a	third	name	or	
rhema’	need	mean	
no	more	than	this:	
that	the	copula	is	
the	third	element	
among	names	and	
rhemata	counted	
together,	i.e.	the	
third	word.	
(2015:	51)
	 	 This	third	element	
is	merely	syntactic	
and	not	a	third	
morphological	or	
semantic	component	
with	an	existential	
import,	as	suggested	
in	his	note	53.	In	Int. 
(10.19b19–25),	cited	by	
Ademollo	in	support	
of	his	view,	Aristotle	
discusses	the	copula	
as	a	syntactic	element	
signifies something, but is not, as yet, anything true or false unless ‘is’ or 
‘is not’ is added, either in the present or in some other tense. 
(16a10–18)
In this passage, Aristotle begins elaborating the distinction between attribu-
tive and affirmative signs – the first philosopher to do so. The expressions 
‘man’, ‘white’, even ‘goat-stag’ signify (se¯máinei), but they are not referring 
expressions unless they are combined with a verb (either in the present or 
another tense) so as to assert something of a name. The expression ‘the horse 
is running’ is a referring statement or affirmation (katáphasis), where some-
thing is said or predicated of something else. Running is said of the horse, but 
not because the two words are related by ‘is’, which does not play the role of 
a predicate and is merely attributive:
When uttered on their own, verbs are words and signify something – 
the speaker arrests his thought and the hearer pauses – but they do not 
yet signify whether something is or not. For even ‘to be’ or ‘not to be’ 
is not a sign of the actual thing even if you speak of the being; for by 
itself it is nothing, but it additionally signifies some combination, which 
cannot be thought of without the components. 
(16b19–25)
These lines, as well as Int. 16a10–18 cited above, have opened a huge debate 
over the centuries about whether Aristotle’s assertions have existential import 
or not (Bäck 2000; De Rijk 2002). As early as the later Greek commentators 
on Aristotle, the propositional ‘is’ has been considered as having two impli-
cations, an affirmative one and an existential one. On one hand, ‘is’ is taken 
as having a meaning of its own, which makes the copula a separate semantic 
and syntactic entity, namely a connector (Barnes 2007: 192).23 Further, accord-
ing to the influential Grammar and Logic of Port Royal, the copula expresses 
a mental connection between the subject ‘Sam’ and the predicate ‘white’.24 
Arnauld et al. ([1660, 1662] 1972) write:
The main use of the verb is to signify an affirmation […] the verb itself 
should have no other use than to mark the connection we make in our 
minds between the two terms of a proposition. But only the verb ‘to be’, 
called the substantive, retains this simplicity, and properly retains it only 
in the third person, present, is […]. 
(Port Royal Logic, II.ii, 109; Grammar, 90, Chapter 2.xii, our translation)
As a result, a proposition was traditionally considered as consisting of three terms: 
subject, predicate and the ‘is’, signifying an affirmation by connecting the two: 
the judgment we make of things, as when I say: ‘the earth is round’, is 
called proposition; & thus, every proposition necessarily comprises two 
terms, one called subject, which is that of which one affirms, such as 
earth; & the other called attribute, which is what is affirmed, such as 
round; & in addition, the connection between these two terms, is. 
(Grammar, Chapter 2.i, 28–29, our translation, original emphasis)
On the other hand, the meaning of ‘is’ is also taken as denoting the existence 
of the subject it connects to the predicate. Many later commentators also hold 
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but	not	as	a	morpheme.	
He	shows	how	logical	
predication	takes	the	
grammatical	form	of	
a	sentence	and	gives	
the	example	of	the	two	
ways	of	expressing	a	
contradiction	when	
the	copula	takes	a	
predicate	to	make	a	
verb.	
	 24.	 In	a	way,	the	Port Royal 
Logic	([1660,	1662]	1972)	
prefigures	Noriega-
Olmos’	(2013)	attempt	
to	psychologize	
Aristotelian	linguistic	
relations	and	
significations.
	 25.	 On	Aristotle’s	
distinction	between	
names	and	verbs	see	
also	the	Poetics	20	
(1457a10–18).
that ‘S is …’ propositions make an existence claim as well as connecting the 
subject to the predicate. Thus Bäck (2000: 11), in his aspect-theory of predi-
cation, argues that ‘a categorical sentence, of the form “S is P” is to be read 
as: “S is (existent) as a P”. The copula “is” asserts the claim of existence; the 
predicate informs us how S exists, namely, as a P’. Further on, Bäck explains 
that: ‘an affirmation of being per se states that the subject exists in re’ (2000: 
96, original emphasis). 
However, on our view, in the first chapters of Int. Aristotle deals with how 
words are related to thoughts, both in and without combination, rather than 
with how expressions are involved in making existential claims. For the gram-
matical laws governing the correct combination of words into larger linguistic 
expressions do not tell us anything about the laws governing the correct combi-
nation of real properties into larger units of ‘reality’, even when the usage of 
verbs like ‘to be’ is at stake. As Barnes (1996: 192) points out, ‘“in” is a verb-
forming operator on names: it takes a term and makes a verb (or verbal phrase)’. 
According to both Aristotle and Frege, the third person singular ‘is’ cannot act as 
a link between signifying expressions in an affirmation, because it is not signifi-
cant by itself and does not hold of anything. In an affirmation, as Frege shows 
in the Begriffschrift (1879: §§4), the judgement stroke is formally applied to the 
semantic content ‘the horse is running’ (or ‘the horse runs’): running(horse). 
Aristotle makes this point in Int. 3 when he says that ‘is’ does not signify 
anything true or false, because ‘by itself [“to be”] is nothing, but it additionally 
signifies some combination, which cannot be thought of without the compo-
nents’ (16b24–25). Unlike medieval logicians and their contemporary followers 
on one hand and the logicians of Port Royal on the other, Frege and Aristotle 
do not consider ‘is’ as the logical, semantic or psychological copula. The latter 
is neither affirmed of the semantic content nor introduces a psychological 
relation between name and verb (Aubenque 2009: 45–46; Barnes 2009: 159). 
On our reading of Frege and Aristotle (esp. 16a18–22), for them a linguistic 
expression denotes or has a Bedeutung, if a verb is combined with a name, and 
the copula is not needed. As Aristotle puts it: ‘I say that a verb is always the 
sign […] of things one says of a subject’ (16b10).
4.1. Aristotle on the signification of names and verbs
Aristotle explains that a verb is ‘a sign of things said of something else’ (16b7). 
A term in the predicate position plays a different role from a term in the 
subject position. This is how he distinguishes between names and verbs: they 
have different grammatical functions. ‘A name (ónoma) is an expression signi-
fying by convention, without signifying time’ (16a18–19). A verb (rhêma), on 
the other hand, ‘is that which additionally signifies time […] and it is a sign 
of things said of something else’. (16b6–7).25 Aristotle seems to have been the 
first author to attach time (or tense) to verbs (Whitaker 1996: 53–54; Barnes 
2007: 8–9). In addition, he classifies verbs as attributive signs, thus distin-
guishing them from names: ‘I say that a verb is always the sign of attributes, 
for example of things one says of a subject’ (16b10). For this reason, we disa-
gree with Ademollo (2015: 48–50) who seems to consider names and verbs as 
synonymous, since, for him, they are both names. On our reading, Aristotelian 
names and verbs are both onómata in the sense that they are both words, but 
rhémata are not names (nouns), precisely because they do not have the same 
semantic and syntactic function as names: verbs are used to say something of 
a subject, whereas names denote both subjects and predicates. On the other 
hand, verbs are not to be identified with predicates. 
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	 26.	 Cf.	Pelletier	(1994:	
11).	Interestingly,	Z.	
G.	Szabó	(2012:	1.6.4)	
construes	Frege’s	
context	principle	as	
a	compositionality	
principle:	‘the	meaning	
of	an	expression	
is	determined	by	
the	meanings	of	all	
complex	expressions	
in	which	it	occurs	as	a	
constituent’.	
	 27.	 This	is	the	well-known	
context	principle,	
as	stated	in	Die 
Grundlagen der 
Arithmetik	(G.	Frege,	
1884)	and	in	‘Sinn	und	
Bedeutung’	(1892:	27).	
From a contemporary point of view, Aristotle’s account of names and verbs 
prefigures two semantic principles we have come to know as the ‘context 
principle’ and the ‘compositionality principle’, for the formulation of which 
Frege is credited today.26 According to him (1884: §62), ‘never [...] ask for the 
meaning of a word in isolation, but only in the context of a proposition’. 27 On 
this view, words mean something only in the context of a statement. In Int. 2, 
Aristotle states that no part of a noun is significant in isolation: 
A noun, then, is an utterance (pho¯nê) that is meaningful (se¯mantikê) by 
convention and timelessly, of which no part in isolation is significant 
(se¯mantikòn kekho¯risménon). In the name ‘Good-horse’ (Kálippos), the 
component ‘-horse’ ([h]ippos) signifies nothing by itself (kath’hautó), as 
it does in the phrase (lógos) good horse (kalòs híppos). 
(16a19–22)
When distinguishing between simple and complex nouns, Aristotle advances 
a context principle with a compositionality constraint: complex expressions 
are constructed from simple expressions, but the signification of the lexical 
component parts of a complex expression depends on context. For exam-
ple: as a component part of the proper name Goodman, the lexical item -man 
does not signify anything, but this constraint only applies to the constitutive 
parts of this expression. By contrast, the word man does signify something 
as a component part of the phrase, good man. We might say that Aristotle 
subscribes to a moderate contextualism by claiming that simple nouns have 
no significant components, whereas complex nouns do, but the signification 
of their parts is context-dependent. Aristotle writes: 
The case is not the same with simple nouns as it is with complex ones. 
In the former, the parts do not signify in any way, whereas, in the latter, 
they do, in a way, but not of anything in isolation: for instance, ‘kéle¯s’ in 
the word pirate-ship (epaktrokéle¯s). 
(16a22–26, emphasis added; cf. 16b30–33)
Aristotle claims that the component part ‘kéle¯s’ does not signify by itself 
(kath’hautó), independently of the context of the compound epaktrokéle¯s, in 
which it contributes to the sense pirate-ship. R. J. Hankinson (1987: 220–21) 
reconstructs an amusing reading of the noun kéle¯s, which besides designating 
horse or boat also denotes a sexual position, of a woman ‘doing the horse-
man’. On his reading of 16a24–26, ‘kéle¯s’ is restricted to and determined by the 
context of the complex noun pirate-ship, indicating that the context principle is 
correlated with a compositionality constraint. 
4.2. Aristotle on verbs: from attributive signs to logical predicates
In addition, Aristotle emphasizes the major role played by verbs in producing 
signifying expressions, which are truth-evaluable. He expounds his view on 
linguistic signification by determining verbs along the same lines as names. 
Hence the beginning of Chapter 3 omits the main part of the general defini-
tion of names proposed in Chapter 2: ‘an expression signifying by convention’ 
(16a19–20; repeating only ‘of which no part in isolation is significant’). Instead, 
at 16b6–7, Aristotle stresses two further elements: ‘a verb is that which addi-
tionally signifies time (tò prosse¯máinon khrónon), [...] and it is a sign of things 
said of something else (tôn kath’hetérou legoméno¯n se¯méion)’. Let us begin by 
examining the latter.
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	 28.	 However,	as	stated	
below,	‘verbs’	are	not	
to	be	confused	with	
‘predicates’,	nor	are	
they	linguistic	‘signs’	
of	predicates,	as	some	
ancient	and	modern	
commentators	tend	
to	claim.	On	verbs	and	
predicates	in	ancient	
logic	and	grammar	see	
Barnes	(2007:	100–14,	
esp.	113:	‘a	predicate	is	
a	predicate	of	a	subject	
in	a	proposition:	a	verb	
is	not	a	verb	of	a	name	
in	a	sentence	–	it	is	a	
verb	full stop’,	original	
emphasis).
	 29.	 See	for	example	
Alexander	of	
Aphrodisias,	
Commentary on 
Aristotle’s Topics	
(27.12–8	Wallies).
Like names, verbs are simple signifying expressions, but unlike names, 
they have different grammatical functions. By themselves, verbs serve as 
names signifying something (16b19–20). However, when combined with 
other names in a sentence, they also function as attributions of something 
else (16b13). In simple indicative sentences, their attribution turns into logi-
cal predication, which affirms or denies something (a predicate) of something 
else (a subject), thus making the statement either true or false (17a2–4, 20–26; 
cf. 16a9–16).28 For that reason, Aristotle claims that each proposition “must 
consist of a name and verb, […] and without a verb, there is no affirmation or 
negation’ (19b10–12; cf. 17a9–10). 
This claim entails that the ‘syntactic’ role of verbs (particularly of the verb 
‘is’, to which the text pays constant attention) may be considered a middle 
term in the transition from the ‘semantics’ of simplest signifying expressions 
(Chapters 1–3) to the ‘logic’ of complex assertions as truth-bearers (Chapter 4 
to the end) in Int. According to Aristotle, when spoken in succession, names 
by themselves do not form a statement; rather verbs bring about ‘combina-
tion’ or ‘separation’ in all propositions. On this account, truth and falsity bear 
on the class of ‘signifying expressions’ only when a verb, besides signifying 
stricto sensu something said of something else, ‘additionally signifies’ that the 
attribution it makes holds of the subject (cf. Whitaker (1996: 137–38; Barnes 
2007: 247–50). Likewise, each verb ‘additionally signifies’ time: it is not that 
‘time’ is part of its semantic content, but rather that in the indicative mode 
the verb indicates the period of time for which its attribution holds true of the 
subject.
Taking up the issues of truth and falsity in simple propositions, in the 
subsequent chapters of Int. Aristotle develops the basic classification of asser-
tions set in contradictory pairs. Consequently, the treatise was viewed as a 
logical work by the later tradition. Probably in the first or second century ad, it 
was incorporated into the so-called Organon, the corpus of Aristotelian logical 
writings used in late antiquity. Hence the ‘linguistic’ chapters of Int., as well 
as other aspects of the treatise, were considered inferior (or at best auxiliary) 
to its logical achievements. However, restricting the scope of Int. exclusively 
to the domain of ‘logic’ fails to account for its unity. Surprisingly, a scrutiny 
of the supposed main topic of the treatise shows that Aristotle closely relates 
the standard classification of logical propositions to certain rules of ‘gram-
mar’ and ‘semantics’, which, in turn, relate to speech and verbal communi-
cation. The audience addressed by Aristotle at the beginning of Int. was still 
versed in doing philosophy by engaging in Socratic conversations and dialec-
tical debates,29 and little use would have been made of any later demarcations 
between grammar, logic and linguistics.
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Undoubtedly, the first chapters of Int. posit the basis for Aristotle’s theory 
of signification. On our view, the main problem of a theory of signification 
is how we can say something about things, which usually takes the form of 
saying what we think about things, and ensure that a hearer correctly grasps 
the message we wish to convey. For that reason, Aristotle’s main concern here 
is to set out the rules for an appropriate match between words and thoughts 
for successful communication. Thoughts are communicated through speech, 
which, unlike them, is governed by syntactic and semantic rules regarding the 
combination of ‘spoken sounds’. In this way, we emphasize the linguistic and 
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communicational aspect of Aristotle’s account of signification rather than its 
ontological or psychological implications (cf. Noriega-Olmos 2013: 123–25). 
This is how we see the scope of the initial chapters of Int.
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